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THE CONSCIENCE OF
THE LAWt
REV. JOSEPH E. HOGAN, C.M.*
The time is 399 B.C. The place is Athens, Greece. The occasion is the
trial of Socrates. The charges brought against him by the leaders of the
restored democracy were: First, not worshipping the gods whom the state
worships, but introducing new and unfamiliar religious practices; and,
second, corrupting the Athenian youth. The prosecutor demands the death
penalty.
The original source of this information is Diogenes Laertius to whom
we owe most of the biographical and source material of pre-Socratic philos-
ophy.' It is my purpose, however, to concentrate on "the conscience of the
law," extolled by Socrates at his trial.
As the trial progressed, with Socrates acting as his own counsel, we
learn that the first charge was never explicitly defined and the second
could not be satisfactorily supported because of a grant of amnesty by the
very political leader who instigated the trial. Despite these facts Socrates
was condemned to death by a majority vote of the jurors. His execution
had to be delayed about a month, thus allowing sufficient time for his
friends to arrange an escape. Socrates refused to take advantage of their
offers, however, on the ground that such a course of action would be con-
trary to his principles that one "must do what his city and his country
order him; or he must change their view of what is just."2 We read in the
Phaedo that, as a consequence of his respect for the law, when the drink
of poison reached his heart there was a convulsive moment and he died "of
all men of his time whom I have known, . . . the wisest and justest and
best."3 Both in his life and in his death he was a witness to the majesty of
the written law, "[one] must do what his city and his country order him,"I
and also to the unwritten law, "or he must change their views of what is
just."5
t This paper is based upon the homily delivered by Father Joseph E. Hogan, C.M. at St.
John's University School of Law's Red Mass, celebrated September 17, 1975.
*Professor of Philosophy, St. John's University. B.A., St. Joseph's College, 1936; M.A. 1942,
Ph. D. 1951, Catholic University.
I See generally DIOGENES LAERTiuS, LivEs OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS (R.D. Hicks transl. Har-
vard Univ. Press 1925).
2 THE WORKS OF PLATO 102 (I. Edman ed. B. Jowett transl. Random House 1928).
Id. at 189.
' Id. at 102.
Id.
CONSCIENCE OF THE LAW
In probing the conscience of the unwritten law of universal justice, our
sourcebook is fittingly the classic Greek tragedy Antigone composed by an
older contemporary of Socrates and a fellow citizen of the Greek
state-Sophocles.1 It is this universal justice, binding on all men, including
those who have neither association nor covenant with one another, that
Antigone refers to when she says that the burial of her brother Polyneices
was just, despite the prohibition of written law. She meant that his burial
was just by nature, by a natural justice, for the unwritten laws of God live
"not of today nor yesterday, the same throughout all time they live; and
whence they came none knoweth."7
This continuum of natural justice appears again in remarkable pas-
sages of Cicero's On the Commonwealth:
There is in fact a true law-namely right reason-which is in accordance with
nature . . . .It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens,
nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law,
eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there
will be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who
is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor.'
As time passed and the legal genius of the Romans became more evident,
the classic distinction was introduced between that which is just (jus) and
the command to do that which is just (lex).
Is it not remarkable that at this early stage the is of codified law
becomes correlated with the ought of unwritten law? Is it not more remark-
able that these two forms of law seemed to coexist with an empathy that
is not only absent today, but whose very existence is denied? I refer to the
psychological gap interposed by legal positivists between the enactments
of positive law and the moral obligations of the higher law written in the
heart of mankind.
It is this timeless conscience of the law that should be our contempo-
rary concern-a return, in a sense, to the realism in American law evi-
denced in the 1920's. That movement, it appears to me, resembled a return
to the ancient Roman distinction of whether the law that is corresponds
adequately with what ought to be in natural justice. Moreover, it would
supply the necessary corrective to today's voluntarism in law which em-
phasizes a kind of sociological justice not unlike the "greatest good of the
greatest number" under the rubric of utilitarianism. As an ethical theory,
utilitarianism maintains that the moral good or the moral evil of human
actions is determined by the good or bad consequences to society which
* See SoPHoCLEs, THz ANTIGONE (G. Murray transl. George, Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1941).
Id. at 38 vv. 456-58.
MARCUS TULuUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH 215-16 (Bk. III) (G. Sabine & S. Smith
transl. Ohio State Univ. Press 1929).
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these actions produce. Within this frame of reference, the guarantor of
what ought to be the actual needs of human existence, instead of being
right reason becomes the will of the majority. At this point the enactments
of written law become separated from the actual obligations of the unwrit-
ten law, resulting in the identification of law with will and ultimately
inviting the tyranny of the majority.
A cause cMI~bre representative of this type of legislation and precipi-
tating much soul searching was the decision of the United States Supreme
Court last January 22, 1973, which legalized abortion,9 a decision which
was characterized by one Justice as "an exercise of raw judicial power."1,
In the wake of this decision, concerned citizens are perplexed by argumen-
tation which substantively concludes that people may follow their own
religious and moral convictions in the private sector of their lives, but
disbars them from voicing such beliefs in the public sector of a pluralistic
society. The irony of this rhetoric is that it is articulated by the adherents
of a value system which is cleverly contrived to fit into our constitutional
neutrality toward religious and moral values, but it is de facto a religion
of secular humanism-utilitarianism.
In forbidding the establishment of any religion, our Constitution pro-
vides for the freedom of all religions. It does not give a priority to areligious
ideologies of secular humanism and thereby deny the right of other reli-
gious and moral groups to intervene in the formulation of public policy.
Citizens and groups each have the right and duty to advocate the adoption
of whatever public policy they judge in conscience to be in the best interest
of the commonwealth. Those of us whose consciences are formed in the
more traditional modes of religion and morality should not be expected to
either remain mute or submit uncritically to the "new morality" of utilitar-
ianism. In fact, the seeming reasonableness of this position is supported
by frequent public welfare programs to alleviate poverty, provide adequate
health facilities, and develop environmental safeguards-all motivated in
part by religious and moral concerns for the well-being of all.
I am reminded at this time of the eighteenth and twenty-first amend-
ments to the Constitution, prescribing and proscribing prohibition. This
costly experiment represented an effort to treat the social consequences of
drunkenness through legislation. The law was prompted by many mo-
tives-to eliminate poverty, to prevent the breakup of homes, to curb
delinquency and crime, and even to promote patriotism-and championed
by proponents from varied religious and moral backgrounds. The legisla-
tion did not solve the problems for which it was passed; yet, we must reflect
on the fact that it was an intervention in a moral issue by a majority of
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972i.
" Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
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the citizens through their representatives in three-quarters of the states
and in the Houses of Congress, both for the original amendment and again
for its repeal.
I mention this because, like the abortion question, it too represented
an attempt at legislating morality by a majority vote. This seems signifi-
cant to me since the related argument to that of disqualifying persons
because of religious and moral beliefs is that the majority of the people will
always know what is good for mankind. This is not necessarily so. As our
own history sadly attests-the treatment of the American Indian, the
abomination of slavery, the segregation of Japanese in concentration
camps during World War II-the majority can be both stupid and brutal."I
Like the prohibitionists, the abortionists have manipulated public
opinion to accept legalized abortion as a solution to our vast social prob-
lems. The utilitarian ethic of "the end justifies the means" has been canon-
ized by the highest court in our land. This positive legislation represents
the prescriptive is of civil law, but ignores the fundamental moral ought
of the unwritten law of natural justice.
It is not my purpose to concentrate only on the abortion issue relative
to the sanctity of life and the value judgments involved in legislative enact-
ments. Yet, this decision has reactivated past antilife proposals and pro-
grams and opens the way to new life-control experimentation and further
conscience conflicts in other areas. This open door to utopian utilitarian-
ism, while it dates back many centuries, is today more awesome due to the
expertise of our technological culture. I would propose for consideration a
few areas of contemporary significance:
Experimentation, Not Therapy
Although the dates indicate technical achievements rather than gen-
eral availability, one author has envisioned:
PHASE ONE: by 1975
Extensive transplantation of limbs and organs
Test tube fertilization of human eggs
Implantation of fertilized eggs in womb
Indefinite storage of eggs and spermatozoa
Choice of sex in offspring
Extensive power to postpone clinical death
Mind-modifying drugs: regulation of desire
Memory erasure
Imperfect artifical placenta
Artificial viruses
See generally G. GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MyrHs, THE REAuTIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS 270
(1970).
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PHASE TWO: by 2000
Extensive mind modification and personality reconstruction
Enhancement of intelligence in men and animals
Perfected artifical placenta and true baby-factory
First cloned animals
Man-animal chimeras
PHASE THREE: after 2000 on
Control of ageing: extension of life span
Disembodied brains
Brain-computer links
Gene insertion and deletion
Cloned people
Man-machine chimeras
Indefinite postponement of death12
The legal and moral questions are: First, whether we are to do with
legal and moral responsibility everything that we can do technically; and
second, should science do everything it can do?
Health Facilities and Personnel
It is not a secret that, as a result of the abortion decision, health
services facilities and personnel, especially Catholic, are anguishing about
their continued existence as Christian witnesses to and service of the sick
and dying. This anguish is caused by proposals from state and federal
agencies that these Catholic facilities and personnel be allowed to perform
abortions and contraceptive sterilization.'3 Such proposals are in direct
conflict with the moral convictions and directives of Catholic hospitals
which do not allow their facilities or personnel to cooperate in such proce-
dures."
Catholic Higher Education
The Bundy Program,'5 with which we are quite familiar, prohibits the
receipt by private educational institutions of New York State aid as long
" G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 204-05 (1968).
,3 See generally Schwager, Legal and Ethical Problems Present in Catholic Health Facilities,
19 CATHOLIC LAWYER 259 (1973).
" Ad Hoc Comm. on Pro-Life Activities, Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pastoral
Guidelines for the Catholic Hosp. and Catholic Health Care Personnel, April 11, 1973.
11 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6401 (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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as the institutions remain religiously committed. To remain faithful to its
Catholic commitment, our own university sacrifices financial assistance
otherwise available through this program in excess of $3 million a year.
A Living Will
An organization called the Euthanasia Educational Fund is distribut-
ing a form, not legally binding, which declares that if the time arrives when
one can no longer actively participate in decisions affecting his or her own
future, this "will" is to be a statement of personal wishes. The form reads
in part:
If there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from physical or mental
or spiritual disability, I, [name] request that I be allowed to die and not be
kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures. . . . I do not fear death as
much as I fear the indignity of deterioration, dependence and hopeless pain.
I ask that drugs be mercifully administered to me for terminal suffering even
if they hasten the moment of death.'"
If one were to read the above uncritically it would appear to be com-
patible with Catholic teaching on natural dying and death. A more reflec-
tive reading from the perspective of Catholic moral teaching on this sub-
ject, however, reveals the absence in this form of presumptions which are
implicit in our Catholic position, namely, the patient is expected to be
prepared both spiritually and temporally for death; the determination not
to use extraordinary means is made at a particular time and under specific
circumstances, and not the long-range decision implicit in the living will;
and the disability criteria and the identity of the responsible person mak-
ing such a decision are more specific and determinative than the vague
generalities of the "will," especially in comparison with its total lack of
specificity as to who will make the judgment according to such criteria.
Although, as was indicated above, this is not legally or morally bind-
ing, it seems to qualify as a wedge principle for legalizing voluntary eu-
thanasia and, ultimately, involuntary euthanasia. The technique which
the Euthanasia Educational Fund is presently using is a form of propa-
ganda to form the public according to their point of view. And this, it
seems to me, qualifies under the ethic of utilitarianism.
In concluding these reflections on "the conscience of the law" there
are a number of considerations I would stress.
First, the conscience obligation imposed by any just law is based on
the natural moral order, and this is ultimately dependent upon God.
Second, although they are interrelated and interdependent, legality
and morality are not identical. They overlap, but they are not coextensive.
,1 Euthanasia Educational Fund, A Living Will, November 1970.
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There are crimes that are sins and sins that are crimes, but crimes and sins
are not the same realities. It is in this critical existential area of private
and/or public morality that general moral principles alone do not decide
particular cases, but the particular cases cannot be decided without the
general moral principles.
Third, the civil law must respect the natural moral law. A manmade
law cannot morally command actions which are violations of natural
rights, nor can it prohibit the reasonable exercise of these same natural
rights. It distresses me to conclude that the Burger Court's decision re-
moves the unborn from the privileges accorded by law to human beings as
the Taney Court's decision in the Dred Scott case" made it impossible for
the American black to be accorded the privileges of citizenship. The latter,
as we know, was corrected by constitutional amendment. May we hope for
the same happy outcome for the former?
Fourth, the professional moralists and ethicians are cognizant of the
dependence of the moral law upon the legal order for clarification, determi-
nation, updating of moral obligations in our contemporary life situations,
and protective and coactive assistance in maintaining and developing pub-
lic order in society. It seems to me, however, that on both the moral and
civil levels, there is a serious need to disabuse the public of any opinion
that law is primarily minimal and punitive.
Finally, this change of attitude can be achieved in a formal manner
within the lecture halls and classrooms of our law schools, our colleges, and
universities. It seems that in such a setting the professors of jurisprudence,
medical ethics, and moral philosophy could emphasize the educative force
of law for inculcating a public morality in our citizens that would assure
the true common good of all-the good of man as man. This same objective
can be achieved in another way by legislating sound public policy that will
provide for the moral order as well as for the civil order of society. The
consequences of this could be a moral consensus among our citizens which
is sufficiently compelling to reawaken that timeless declaration of our
Founding Fathers: "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
May St. Thomas More, patron of The Catholic Lawyer, and witness
by his own martyrdom to the conscience of the law, pray for us.
'1 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
